Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination by Cachon, Gerard. P & Kok, Abdullah Gurhan
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers Wharton Faculty Research
3-2010
Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply
Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination
Gerard. P. Cachon
University of Pennsylvania
Abdullah Gurhan Kok
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Other Business
Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/183
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cachon, G. P., & Kok, A. (2010). Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination.
Management Science, 56 (3), 571-589. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1122
Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual
Form and Coordination
Abstract
It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage
their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer
selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that
some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting, where multiple manufacturers
sell through a single retailer. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of
three types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract, or a two-part tariff. It is well
known that the latter two, more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply
chain, thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms. More importantly, they allow the manufacturer to
extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her
reservation profit. However, we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the
manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale-price contracts, and
this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off. In other words, although in a serial
supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two-part tariffs, a retailer may
actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a
contractual form exhibits in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in
which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer.
Keywords
contracting, competition, retailing, wholesale-price contract, quantity discount, two-part tariff
Disciplines
Operations and Supply Chain Management | Other Business
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/183
Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On
Contractual Form and Coordination1
Gérard P. Cachon A. Gürhan Kök
The Wharton School Fuqua School of Business
University of Pennsylvania Duke University
Philadelphia PA, 19104 Durham NC, 27708
cachon@wharton.upenn.edu gurhan.kok@duke.edu
opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~cachon faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~agkok
January 18, 2009
Abstract
It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the
rms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either
on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly
competing) retailers. We nd that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply
in our setting. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailers business using one of
three types of contracts, a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract or a two-part
tari¤. It is well known that there are two reasons why a monopolist manufacturer prefers either of
the latter two, more sophisticated, contracts relative to the wholesale-price contract. First, they
can be used to coordinate the supply chain, meaning that they induce the retailer to sell more
because they reduce the double marginalization caused by wholesale-price contracts. Second, they
can be used to extract rents from the retailer, in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the
retailer only with her reservation prot. However, we show that in our market structure these two
sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively than when they only
o¤er wholesale-price contracts, and this may leave them worse o¤ and the retailer substantially
better o¤. In other words, although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to
fear quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s, a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when
o¤ered by competing manufacturers. We conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits
in a one-manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple
manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through a single retailer.
1The authors would like to thank Awi Federgruen, Leslie Marx and Richard Staelin for helpful discussions.
1. Introduction
The literature on supply chain coordination has studied several contractual forms in settings with
a single manufacturer and one or more retailers. One of the key results from this literature
is that wholesale-price contracts lead to suboptimal decisions for the supply chain (i.e., double
marginalization) and more sophisticated contracts (like quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s) can
be employed to achieve both channel coordination (i.e., maximize the supply chains prot) and
rent extraction (i.e., the ability to allocate a high share of the prots to the manufacturer). Our
objective in this paper is to test this conclusion in a setting in which multiple manufacturers
compete to sell their products through a single retailer.
In our model, two manufacturers simultaneously o¤er to the retailer one of three types of
contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a quantity-discount contract (i.e., a decreasing per-unit price
in the quantity purchased) or a two-part tari¤ (i.e., a per unit price and a xed fee). The retailers
prices determine the productsdemand rates, and she sets her prices to maximize her total prot
given the o¤ered contracts and her inventory costs, which may exhibit economies of scale. The
model setting represents one of the most common supply chain structures, as many manufacturers
sell their products through retailers that also sell products of other manufacturers. A typical
example is Procter&Gambles Crest versus Colgate in the toothpaste category at a supermarket.
As with all supply chain structures, the rms are indirectly interested in the total prot in
the supply chain, and more directly interested in their share of that prot. In supply chains
with a monopolist manufacturer it has been shown that a properly designed quantity-discount or
two-part tari¤ allows the manufacturer to maximize his products total prot (i.e., the two rms
combined prot). Furthermore, the manufacturer can extract the largest possible share of that
prot, thereby leaving the retailer with her reservation prot, which is the prot the retailer can
earn if the retailer rejects the contract. In a serial supply chain the retailers reservation prot is
assumed to be an exogenous constant that reects the retailers bargaining power - an increase in
the retailers bargaining power is modeled by increasing the retailers reservation prot. However,
in our structure with two manufacturers, the retailers reservation prot is endogenous - the prot
the retailer can earn if it were to reject manufacturer As o¤er depends on what manufacturer B
o¤ers, and vice-versa. This distinction is signicant and, as we demonstrate, important for our
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ndings.
We show that, holding the other manufacturers contract o¤er xed, a manufacturer can increase
its prot by using a more sophisticated contract relative to a wholesale-price contract. Furthermore,
in equilibrium (i.e., a pair of contracts such that neither manufacturer has an incentive to o¤er a dif-
ferent contract given the other manufacturers contract o¤er), we show that the more sophisticated
contracts can increase the supply chains total prot, again relative to the wholesale-price contract.
These results are analogous to those found in models with a monopolist manufacturer. However,
in sharp contrast to the results with one manufacturer, we also nd that in equilibrium, if the
products are close substitutes, the manufacturers may earn substantially less when sophisticated
contracts are o¤ered and the retailer may earn substantially more.
In a one-manufacturer setting sophisticated contracts are advantageous to the manufacturer
because they allow the manufacturer to increase and extract rents. These abilities are present
even with multiple manufacturers (holding the other manufacturers contract xed), but now there
is an additional e¤ect - the sophisticated contracts also yield more aggressive competition between
the manufacturers. This additional e¤ect may dominate the others - quantity discounts and two-
part tari¤s e¤ectively increase the retailers bargaining power relative to wholesale-price contracts,
so much so that the manufacturers can be worse o¤ with them relative to an equilibrium in which
they both o¤er wholesale-price contracts. To explain further, in our multiple-manufacturer model
the retailers reservation prot is endogenous and competition between the manufacturers serves to
raise it, in particular when sophisticated contracts are used.
The comparison of equilibrium prots in this setting with two competing manufacturers and
a common retailer leads to additional insights on contracting that are di¤erent from those in
a serial supply chain and those in two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers (as in
McGuire and Staelin, 1983). In those settings, two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts are
equivalent from the perspective of the manufacturers and the retailer, and the retailer always prefers
the wholesale-price contracts. In our setting, the manufacturers always prefer two-part tari¤s to
quantity discounts. The retailer prefers aggressive quantity discounts to two-part tari¤s, and prefers
the wholesale-price contract to both when the products are close substitutes. While the retailers
contract preferences are the reverse of the manufacturersfor low and high substitutability cases,
all rms prefer the more sophisticated contracts to wholesale-price contracts for a range of medium
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substitutability because the increase in supply chain prot dominates the e¤ects of competition
and rent extraction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 present our analysis of the retailers problem, Section 5 the
analysis and comparison of the wholesale-price, quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ games, and
Section 6 the numerical study. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in the
Appendix.
2. Relation to Literature
The present paper is foremost a commentary on the supply chain coordination literature (see
Cachon 2003 for a review). As already discussed, this literature focuses on either relationships
with bilateral monopoly or models with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. Wholesale-price
contracts are nearly always found to be ine¢ cient and more sophisticated contracts can be used to
eliminate that ine¢ ciency and reallocate rents arbitrarily between the parties in the supply chain.2
There is an extensive literature on supply chain coordination with quantity-discount contracts and
price-dependent demand (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983, Moorthy 1987, Ingene and Perry 1995)
and on lot-size coordination with xed demand (e.g., Monahan 1984, Corbett and de Groote 2000),
but they consider only one manufacturer.
Choi (1991), Trivedi (1998), Lee and Staelin (1997), and Martinez de Albeniz and Roels
(2007) study systems with multiple manufacturers and a common retailer, but they only con-
sider wholesale-price contracts. The literature on vertical separation in economics is also relevant
as they study models with multiple manufacturers and retailers that could sell more than one
product. Mathewson and Winter (1987) explore whether or not exclusive dealing arrangements
lead to foreclosure of rivals and the implications for anti-trust laws considering only wholesale-price
contracts. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and OBrien and Sha¤er (1993, 1997) explore similar
issues with two-part tari¤s. Other variations of the basic model include manufacturers that invest
in the retailers to reduce the marginal selling cost (Besanko and Perry, 1994) and manufacturers
2A wholesale-price contract can maximize prots in a system with one manufacturer and multiple quantity com-
peting retailers. However, it provides only one allocation of the systems rents and it isnt even the manufacturers
optimal wholesale price (see Cachon and Lariviere 2005). If retailers compete on price and quantity, then the wholesale
price no longer guarantees coordination (see Bernstein and Federgruen 2003, 2005).
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that assign exclusive territories to retailers to reduce competition (Rey and Stiglitz, 1995). The
general result is that the manufacturers may prefer exclusive dealing due to reduced competition
at the retailer level even though societal welfare and industry prots may be higher with common
agency. This is essentially a comparison of di¤erent supply chain structures, whereas we are con-
cerned with the e¤ect of di¤erent contract types in a given supply chain structure. Also related
to two-part tari¤s, there is a literature on slotting fees (which are essentially two-part tari¤s with
negative payments to the manufacturer, see, for example, Marx and Sha¤er 2004). Kuksov and
Pazgal (2007) show that slotting fees do not occur in a setting with simultaneous manufacturer
competition and a single retailer, and the same result applies in our model.
The literature on strategic decentralization in marketing is highly relevant. McGuire and Staelin
(1983) study two competing supply chains under two structural forms: in each supply chain either
the manufacturer sells to a dedicated retailer via a wholesale-price contract or the manufacturer
vertically integrates into retailing. In either structure the products of the two manufacturers are
sold to consumers from di¤erent rms, whereas in our model the manufacturersproducts are sold
through a single independent retailer. Nevertheless, there are some similarities in our results.
McGuire and Staelin (1983) nd that the manufacturers may prefer to sell via wholesale-price
contracts, despite the fact that they do not coordinate the channel nor allow the manufacturer
to extract all rents, because they dampen retail competition between the two products relative
to the vertically integrated structure. In our model, competition to consumers is held constant,
because we have a single retailer, so what changes is the retailers bargaining power relative to the
manufacturers. Coughlan (1985) conrms the McGuire and Staelin ndings in an empirical study
of the international semiconductor industry. In the context of the McGuire and Staelin model,
Moorthy (1988) provides conditions on the characteristics of the game and the demand function
for decentralization to be an equilibrium strategy and Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show that
decentralization is always the equilibrium when both manufacturers employ two-part tari¤s. In a
di¤erent context with strategic consumers timing their purchase of a product, Desai et al. (2004)
and Arya and Mittendorf (2006) consider a monopolist manufacturer and show that decentralization
through wholesale-price contracts can yield higher prots for the channel.
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3. The Model
There are two products in the market supplied by two di¤erent manufacturers. The products are
partial substitutes and are sold through a common retailer. In the rst stage of the game, the
manufacturers simultaneously announce the payment schemes for their products. In the second
stage, the retailer chooses prices, which determine the productsdemand rates, to maximize her
prot. In addition to the payments to the manufacturer, the retailer incurs operating costs that
depend on the average volume sold of each product. The manufacturers incur constant marginal
production costs.
The retailer faces price sensitive customers. The revenue from product i is
Ri(d) = pi(d)di;
where di is the demand rate of product i; d is the pair of demand rates, and the inverse demand
function is
pi(d) = i   idi   idj ; and i > j > 0 for all i; j:
We elect to work with the inverse demand function for expositional simplicity. The formulation
with the demand function is equivalent to the above.
Let Gi(di) be the retailers inventory related operational costs of product i,
Gi(di) = Kid

i ; Ki  0, 0 <  < 1;
where Ki and  are exogenous constants. This functional form, which exhibits economies of scale,
is a general representation of the inventory costs that arise in common inventory replenishment
models such as a base-stock model3 or an economic order quantity model4.
Let i denote the retailers prot from product i and  = i + j , the retailers total prot. It
follows that
i = Ri(d) Gi (di)  Ti (di) ;
3 In a periodic review model where demand follows a Normal distribution with mean di and standard deviation
id

i , the total inventory related costs with the optimal base-stock level is given by (b+ h)(z
)id

i ; where b is the
backlog penalty per unit, and h is the inventory holding cost per period. Dening Ki = (b+ h)(z)i leads to the
Gi function.
4 In the economic order quantity (EOQ) model, the retailer incurs a xed cost ki per order and a holding cost hi
per unit of inventory held for one period. The well known EOQ formula suggests ordering every
p
2ki=hidi periods.
The resulting optimal inventory and ordering costs is given by
p
2kidihi: Dening Ki =
p
2kihi leads to the Gi
function with  = 1=2.
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and Ti(di) is the payment made to the manufacturer based on the retailers demand rate and their
agreed upon contract.5 Manufacturer is prot is
i = Ti(di)  cidi; (1)
where ci is the manufacturers cost per unit.
We consider three di¤erent types of contracts. With a wholesale-price contract, the payment
function is
Ti(di) = widi;
where wi is the wholesale price chosen by manufacturer i.
We include the following set of quantity-discount contracts:
Ti(di) =

widi   vid2i =2; if di  (wi   ci) =vi
Ti((wi   ci) =vi) + ci (di   (wi   ci) =vi) ; otherwise.
(2)
where wi is a exible parameter chosen by the manufacturer, ci is the manufacturers marginal
cost per unit, and vi is an exogenous constant, where vi 2 [0; v) and v = 2i  
 
i + j

: We
have intentionally designed this set of quantity-discount contracts such that (1) they have a single
parameter, just like the wholesale-price contract, wi, and (2) wholesale-price contracts are a subset
of our quantity-discount contracts - a quantity discount with vi = 0 is a wholesale-price contract.
Although we only consider a subset of possible quantity discounts, this is not overly restrictive.
Our quantity discounts are continuous, di¤erentiable, concave, and the manufacturer does not
sell even the marginal unit for less than its production cost. The bound on vi implies that the
quantity-discount is not too aggressive in the sense that the marginal price paid does not fall
too rapidly as the purchase volume increases, i.e., T 00i (di)   vi: In fact, it can be shown that our
quantity discounts are optimal for the manufacturer (holding the other manufacturers contract
o¤er xed) among all concave and increasing payment functions given the T 00i (di)   vi constraint
(see Proposition 2 in the Appendix). Furthermore, T 00i (di)   vi ensures that the retailers
prot function excluding the operational costs is strictly concave in (d1; d2) : This naturally raises
the question of whether the manufacturer could do better by o¤ering an even more aggressive
5The retailers payment Ti(di) to a manufacturer can be interpreted as a yearly (average) payment based on yearly
(average) volume. Many manufacturer-retailer purchasing contracts are based on the yearly volume rather than on
the volume of individual shipments.
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quantity discount. In a single-product environment, the contract with vi arbitrarily close to v
is the optimal contract, which achieves coordination and full rent extraction. In a two-product
environment, the answer is not clear because retail prots are no longer strictly concave under
more aggressive quantity discounts (i.e., vi  v) and we have found that an equilibrium in the
manufacturers contract o¤er game may not exist6. However, a two-part tari¤ can be interpreted
as the most aggressive quantity discount7, and we do have results for those contracts. Thus,
although we cannot characterize the equilibrium dynamics for all quantity discounts, we have
results for quantity-discounts that are more aggressive than wholesale-price contracts and results
for the most aggressive contract, the two-part tari¤.
As already mentioned, our third contract form is the two-part tari¤, which is characterized by
a xed fee Fi and a marginal cost wi :
Ti (di) = Fi1fdi>0g + widi; (3)
where indicator function 1fdi>0g = f1; if di > 0; 0; otherwiseg.
A symmetric game across manufacturers means that the data for the two products are identical,
i.e., ci, i; i, i; Ki; vi are the same for any i: The subscript i will be dropped in those cases. In
a symmetric solution, the decisions (di at the retail level, wi or Ti at the manufacturer level) are
identical across products.
In the following sections, we solve the problem using backward induction. We analyze the
retailers decision rst and then the game between the manufacturers.
4. The Retailers Problem
In the rst stage of the game, the manufacturers simultaneously announce their contract o¤ers. We
assume that the particular contractual form o¤ered is established before the game begins, but we
later discuss what happens when the manufacturers choose their contractual form and parameters
simultaneously. In the second stage, given functions T1 and T2; the retailer chooses the demand
rates to maximize her prot.
6We provide a numerical example in which there exists no equilibrium. In the example  = 20;  = 2;  = 1; c = 1;
and v = 2 (   ), we get cycling, because manufacturer 1s best response is w1(w2) = fw2   "; if w2  7:75; 8:10,
otherwiseg where " is a small positive constant.
7The marginal cost under a quantity discount contract (2) is given by Ti(di) = fwi  vidi; if di  (wi   ci) =vi; ci;
otherwiseg: As vi !1; Ti(di) = fwi; if di = 0; ci; if di > 0g ; which has the same shape as the marginal cost under
a two-part tari¤ contract.
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We present the analysis assuming that the manufacturers o¤er the retailer quantity discounts,
which, as discussed earlier, are wholesale-price contracts when vi = 0: The analysis of the retailers
problem under two-part tari¤s is similar to that under the wholesale-price contracts. Dene
di(dj) = argmax
di
fi(di; dj)g; (4)
( ~di; ~dj) = argmax
di;dj
f(di; dj) : didj > 0g ; (5)
~ = ( ~di; ~dj) (6)
The retailers optimization problem can now be written as
maxf~; 1(d1(0); 0); 2(0; d2(0))g: (7)
Hence, the optimal solution to the retailers problem is
(d1; d

2) 2 f( ~d1; ~d2); (d1(0); 0); (0; d2(0))g:
For expositional simplicity, we assume the retailer breaks ties in favor of carrying a full product
line over a single product.
Consider the problem of maximizing total supply chain prot. It is equivalent to the retailers
problem if the manufacturers charge only their production cost. Dene ̂1 = 1(d1(0); 0); ̂2 =
2(0; d2(0)); and ̂12 = ( ~d1; ~d2) when Ti(di) = cidi for i = 1; 2. These prot levels are respectively
the maximum prot the system earns, if it were to carry only product 1, only product 2 and both
products. We assume
̂12 > ̂i > 0; for i = 1; 2; (8)
which implies that it is always optimal for the system to carry both products.
Now return to the system with independent manufacturers and a retailer. Let Hi denote the
rst derivative of  with respect to di. We have
Hi = @=@di = i   2idi  
 
i + j

dj  G0i (di)  T 0i (di) ; j 6= i: (9)
Consider rst the case with no economies of scale (i.e., K1 = K2 = 0). The retailers prot function
 is jointly concave in (d1; d2) ; so the unique solution to fHi = 0; i = 1; 2g is the unique optimal
solution. If an interior solution does not exist, then the optimal solution is either (d1(0); 0) or
(0; d2(0)); where di(0) is the unique solution to Hi = 0 with dj = 0: Because  is well behaved, the
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optimal solution (d1; d

2) can be easily characterized and it is a continuous, di¤erentiable function
of the problem inputs such as the parameters of the manufacturer contracts.
The case with economies of scale, however, is rather complicated. Observe that @2=@d2i =
 2i G00i (di)  T 00i (di) is positive at di = 0 and then decreasing in di: Thus,  is convex-concave
in di for xed dj : There are up to two solutions to Hi = 0 and the larger of the two solutions is
a local maximum. di(0) is either the larger solution or zero. Evidently,  is not jointly concave
in (di; dj) : As a result, there may be multiple solutions to fHi = 0; i = 1; 2g and we do not know
which one could be the interior optimal solution. Furthermore, the global optimal solution may be
at one of the boundaries di = 0. A nal technical note is that the prot function is not necessarily
unimodal (in one or two dimensions).
The next theorem shows that there can be at most one interior local maximum and that the
optimal solution is either that interior solution or at one of the boundary lines. That is, there are at
most three candidate optimal solutions and each is characterized by a set of rst order conditions.
Furthermore, in a symmetric problem, the unique interior maximum is a symmetric solution.
Theorem 1 The retailers optimal solution (d1; d

2) 2 f( ~d1; ~d2); (d1 (0) ; 0); (0; d2 (0))g: ( ~d1; ~d2) is
the unique interior optimal solution to fHi = 0; i = 1; 2g and di (0) is given by the larger of the
two solutions to fHi = 0; s.t. dj = 0g. In a symmetric problem, ( ~d1; ~d2) = ( ~d; ~d), where ~d is the
larger of the two solutions to
   2 ( + ) d G0 (d)  T 0 (d) = 0:
In summary, there are at most three local maxima for a retailers problem: one interior solution
in which the retailer carries both products, and two boundary solutions in which the retailer carries
only one product.
While the retailers prot function is generally complex in the presence of economies of scale,
the following conditions ensure that it is jointly concave in (d1; d2). We state and prove this result
in Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
1 = 2 = ; 1 = 2 = ; (10)
T 00i (di)   vi; where 0  vi < v =    ; (11)
2Ri=Gi  j"iij ; for all i, where "ii =  
j
ij   ij
pi
di
(12)
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The condition (10) requires the own- and cross-price coe¢ cients to be symmetric. This is not a
very restrictive assumption, because we allow nonidentical i; which implies di¤erent demand rates
and price elasticities for the products. The condition (11) is stricter than our earlier assumption: it
requires the quantity discount to be less concave to guarantee the concavity of the retailers prot
function. The condition (12) stipulates that the own-price elasticity ("ii) is less than two times the
revenues-to-average inventory costs ratio of the product. (It is similar to the conditions Bernstein
and Federgruen (2003) developed for decentralized retailers and as they point out the conditions
hold for most retailers based on the industry data in Dun and Bradstreet (2006) and Tellis (1988)).
5. ManufacturersProblem
In this section, we analyze the game between the manufacturers which o¤er quantity discounts
(possibly with vi = 0) or two-part tari¤s to the retailer. First, we dene the game and make some
initial observations. We then characterize the equilibria under quantity discounts and two-part
tari¤s in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and compare the equilibria in Section 5.3 for a special
case of the problem.
Each manufacturer chooses its own best response Ti(Tj) given the other manufacturers contract
o¤er Tj .
Ti(Tj) = argmax
Ti(d)
i(d
) for all i; where d = argmax: (13)
An equilibrium of the game is a pair of contracts (T i ; T

j ) such that neither manufacturer has an
incentive to o¤er a di¤erent contract.
The following remark demonstrates how the contracting problem with multiple manufacturers
is di¤erent from that with a single manufacturer.
Remark 1 For any xed contract o¤ered by manufacturer 2 such that 2(0; d2(0)) > 0 :
1. Consider the set of contracts such that the retailers payment to manufacturer 1 is a non-
decreasing function of d1: There does not exist a contract in this set such that the manufac-
turer can extract all of the prot from his product (i.e., it is not possible to have 1 > 0 and
1 = 0).
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2. The retailer accepts manufacturer 1s contract o¤er and stocks both products only if
1( ~di; ~dj)  2(0; d2(0))  2( ~di; ~dj) (14)
Unlike in a serial supply chain, the rst statement implies that a manufacturer must leave
the retailer with some prot to induce the retailer to carry the manufacturers product (see the
Appendix for a detailed proof). In other words, the retailers reservation prot for carrying a
product is greater than zero. However, this does not mean that a single reservation prot exists.
The second statement provides an intuitive condition, (14), for when the retailer is willing to carry
manufacturer 1s product - the retailer must earn more with product 1 in the assortment than
without product 1 in the assortment. The right hand side of (14) can be considered the retailers
reservation prot that the retailer must earn from product 1 for the retailer to be willing to carry
product 1. The rst term, 2(0; d2(0)); is xed, given manufacturer 2s contract o¤er. However,
the second term, 2( ~di; ~dj); depends on manufacturer 1s contract o¤er and it decreases if 1( ~di; ~dj)
is increasing, making it more di¢ cult for the manufacturer to make its o¤er attractive. Therefore,
even if manufacturer 2s contract o¤er is held xed, there does not exist a reservation prot for
product 1 that is independent of manufacturer 1s contract o¤er, as is assumed in models with a
single manufacturer. Put another way, a serial supply chain with a xed reservation prot for the
retailer cannot replicate the dynamics of our model.
It remains to characterize the equilibrium contract o¤ers by the manufacturers. We start with
the following observation that rules out equilibria in which the retailer carries only one product in
symmetric games.
Remark 2 In a symmetric game, there does not exist a manufacturer equilibrium where di = 0
for some i:
The result is due to (8), which guarantees that the inclusion of a manufacturer strictly increases
system prot. Suppose there were an equilibrium in which manufacturer i is excluded. Regardless
of the fraction of ̂j the retailer earns, manufacturer i can o¤er to sell to the retailer at ci + " for
an arbitrarily small " and then the retailers prot increases if it carries product i: If j is excluded
as a result, it will react similarly and be included.
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5.1 Wholesale-Price and Quantity-Discount Contracts
In this section, we partially characterize the equilibrium of the game under quantity-discount and
wholesale-price contracts. In the presence of economies of scale (i.e., ifKi > 0 for any i), we assume
that conditions (10)-(11) hold and we restrict our attention to a region dened by (12). Dene
wi (wj) = maxfwi : dj (wi; wj) = 0g, the maximum wi that makes the retailer exclude product j
and wi (wj) = minfwi : di (wi; wj) = 0g, the minimum wholesale price of i that makes the retailer
exclude product i: Note that wi (wj) may not exist for every wj : In that case, set wi (wj) = ci:
Dene wi (wj) as the best response of manufacturer i, which can be found via a line-search between
[wi; wi] :
The following theorem characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of the contract o¤er
game.
Theorem 2 Consider a symmetric game in which the manufacturers o¤er quantity discounts.
There exists a unique symmetric solution to
di (w1; w2) + (wi   vi   ci)
@di
@wi
= 0; for all i;
denoted (w1; w

2); which is the unique candidate to be a symmetric equilibrium.
As can be seen in the proof of the above theorem, showing the unimodality of a manufacturers
prot in wi requires the use of the second-order properties of the retailers optimal solution (d1; d

2) :
The analysis of a manufacturer game that is built on the solution of a complex problem at the retailer
presents technical di¢ culties in the presence of economies of scale, that have not been present in
any other competition paper in the literature.
We cannot guarantee that the candidate point described in Theorem 2 is an equilibrium. We
show that at (w1; w

2) ; w

i is a local optimum for manufacturer i, and i is concave for wi >
wi : However, the optimal solution wi(w

j ) may be di¤erent than w

i in the range [wi; w

i ] : If
wi(w

j ) = w

i ; then (w

1; w

2) is indeed an equilibrium point. If not, there there exists no symmetric
equilibrium.
Now consider the situation in which there are no economies of scale. This substantially sim-
plies the analysis of both the retailers demand decisions and the manufacturerscontract o¤er
problem. For any (v1; v2) and asymmetric products, we can now guarantee joint concavity of the
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retailers prot and the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium without the symmetry
assumptions. The next theorem provides the closed form solutions for the demand rates and the
contract parameters by solving the rst-order conditions given in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 With no economies of scale (i.e., Ki = 0); there exists a unique equilibrium of the
game in which the manufacturers o¤er quantity discounts. It is characterized by the following
reaction functions and the optimal demand rates:
di =
 
2j   vj

(i   wi) 
 
i + j

(j   wj)
(2i   vi)
 
2j   vj

 
 
i + j
2 ;
wi (wj) =
 
2j   vj

(i) 
 
i + j

(j   wj)
  
 + vi
 
2j   vj

+ ci
 
2j   vj

 
2j   vj
  
 +  + vi
 
2j   vj
 ;
where   (2i   vi)
 
2j   vj

 
 
i + j
2
:
In this section we have assumed that the manufacturers o¤er quantity discounts with an exoge-
nously specied vi: Suppose the manufacturers now simultaneously o¤er a (wi; vi) where they are
free to choose any vi 2 [0; bv] for some bv < v. In other words, they can choose to o¤er a wholesale-
price contract (vi = 0) or a quantity discount (vi > 0): The next proposition indicates, as in
supply chains with a single manufacturer, that a manufacturer prefers to o¤er a quantity-discount
contract and, in particular, prefers more aggressive quantity discounts. Quantity discounts allow
the manufacturer to increase supply chain rents (i.e., reduce double marginalization) and to extract
rents, so they are the preferred contract when the other manufacturers contract is held xed even
when the retailer can adjust its demand allocations between the two products in response.
Proposition 1 Manufacturer is prot strictly increases with vi at the optimal wi. That is, if a
manufacturer is given the option to choose between three contractual forms with vi 2 f0; a; bg such
that 0 < a < b; then i(wi jvi = 0) < i(wi jvi = a) < i(wi jvi = b):
The immediate implication of this proposition is that if the manufacturers endogenously choose
the quadratic parameter of their quantity discount as well as the starting wholesale price, each
manufacturers best response is to choose the most aggressive contract allowed in the system.
The next corollary states that any equilibrium of this game would then have the most aggressive
contracts by both manufacturers.
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Corollary 1 In the contract choice game in which the manufacturers simultaneously o¤er (wi; vi)
and they are free to choose any vi 2 [0; v̂] for some v̂ < v; the equilibrium contracts are such that
vi = v̂ for both manufacturers.
This does not mean however, that the manufacturers are better o¤ at this equilibrium under
quantity discounts than the equilibrium under wholesale-price contracts. Table 1 provides a numer-
ical example to compare the equilibrium solution when the manufacturers o¤er wholesale-price and
quantity-discount contracts for i = 20, i = 2, i = 1, ci = 1, Ki = 0 for all i; and v1 = v2 = 1:6
when quantity discounts are o¤ered.
Contracts o¤ered v1 v2 w1 w

2 d

1 d

2  1 2
Wholesale price 0 0 7.33 7.33 2.11 2.11 26.74 13.37 13.37
Quantity discounts 1.6 1.6 7.59 7.59 2.82 2.82 35.02 12.22 12.22
Table 1: Equilibrium contract parameters, demand rate, and prots under wholesale-price and
quantity-discount contracts.
Recall that a manufacturer prefers to o¤er a quantity discount for any xed contract o¤er by
the other manufacturer. However, this preference does not carry over to the equilibrium analysis.
Competition between the manufacturers is di¤erent when they both o¤er quantity discounts than
when they both o¤er wholesale-price contracts. Apparently, it can be a more aggressive type of
competition. Note, the supply chain is better o¤ with quantity-discounts - as in a supply chain
with a monopolist manufacturer, quantity discounts improve supply chain e¢ ciency. However,
in this example, the retailer captures all of the improved e¢ ciency and even more, leaving the
manufacturers worse o¤. This need not always be true, as we demonstrate in Sections 5.3 and 6.
5.2 Two-Part Tari¤s
In this section, we consider the game between manufacturers that o¤er two-part tari¤ contracts.
Several papers in the industrial organization literature (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) provide
a characterization of the equilibrium with two-part tari¤s. The next theorem generalizes this
characterization to the case with economies of scale at the retailer.
Theorem 4 Given any contract by manufacturer j; the optimal contract of manufacturer i is a
two-part tari¤ contract of the type (Fi; ci) : The equilibrium of the two-part tari¤ game is given by
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F i = ̂12   ̂j for i = 1; 2; j = 3  i. Hence, i = ̂12   ̂j and  = ̂1 + ̂2   ̂12:
As can be seen in the proof of the theorem, showing the optimality of a two-part tari¤ in the
presence of economies of scale requires checking the boundary solutions of the multi-modal retail
prot function so that its product does not get dropped when a manufacturer changes its contract.
The rst result states that the optimal contract for a manufacturer is to set the variable cost equal
to the marginal production cost, thereby making a prot exclusively from the xed fee, i = Fi:
The second part of the theorem states that in equilibrium each manufacturer charges a xed fee
that equals exactly the incremental benet it brings to the whole system. Overall, just as we
have shown that a manufacturer prefers quantity discounts to wholesale-price contracts for a xed
contract o¤er from the other manufacturer (Proposition 1), Theorem 4 indicates that two-part
tari¤s are a dominant strategy for the manufacturer over all contracts - a manufacturer prefers the
more aggressive two-part tari¤s over a wholesale-price contract.
When the manufacturers o¤er two-part tari¤s, the retailer chooses system optimal pricing and
ordering decisions (because the manufacturersper unit prices equal their marginal costs). Hence,
the systems prot is maximized and the allocation of that prot is determined by the xed fees.
System prots are not always maximized when the manufacturers o¤er wholesale-price or quantity-
discount contracts.
Although the manufacturers are able to extract rent more e¤ectively with two-part tari¤s than
with quantity-discounts, they cannot extract all of the prot from their product. The retailer gains
considerable power when she retains stocking and pricing decision rights and the manufacturers
compete. Especially when the products are close substitutes, ̂12 is not much higher than ̂1 or
̂2: Thus, in that case, the retailer captures a large part of the total prot and each manufacturer
gets only ̂12   ̂i; which is relatively small.
5.3 Comparison of the Equilibria for a Special Case
In this section, we consider a special case, a system with symmetric products (i.e., identical
i; i; i; ci; vi) and no economies of scale at the retailer (i.e., Ki = 0); in order to fully charac-
terize and compare the equilibria under all three contract types. We present a numerical study for
the general case in the next section, which provides results similar to the results obtained here.
In this case, Theorem 1 guarantees a unique equilibrium for the quantity-discount game for all
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v < 2 (   ) : (For vi = 2 (   ) ; there may exist no equilibrium.) We are not able to analytically
compare the wholesale-price equilibrium (i.e., v = 0) with the equilibrium under a quantity discount
for arbitrary v; but we can make this comparison at the limit as v goes to 2 (   ). The limit case
can be interpreted as the equilibrium outcome if the manufacturers can endogenously choose (w; v)
as contract parameters, because Corollary 1 states that both manufacturerswill choose the most
aggressive quantity discounts at equilibrium. As we shall see next, the equilibrium of the game
with this most aggressive quantity discount achieves the supply chain optimal solution. Table 2
presents the equilibrium prot terms under the three contract types. The derivation of the prot
expressions are provided in the Appendix.
Contract Manufacturer (i) Retailer () Supply Chain ( +1 +2)
Wholesale price ( c)
2()( )
2(+)(2 )2
( c)22
2(+)(2 )2
( c)2(3 2)
2(+)(2 )2
Quantity discount
as v ! 2 (   )
( c)2( )
4(+)2
( c)2
(+)2
( c)2
2(+)
Two-part tari¤ ( c)
2( )
4(+)
( c)2
2(+)
( c)2
2(+)
Table 2: Equilibrium prots under wholesale-price, quantity-discount, and two-part tari¤ contracts
in the case with symmetric products and no economies of scale.
From the supply chain perspective, the limiting quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ equilibria
result in supply chain optimal prots, while wholesale-price equilibrium does not. This is consistent
with the results for supply chains with a single manufacturer. Other quantity-discount equilibria
with v < 2 (   ) ; however, may not result in supply chain optimal prots as we shall see in the
numerical study.
The next theorem compares the manufacturersprots under the three contract types. Even
though quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s are the dominant strategies over the wholesale-price
contracts, the manufacturers may be worse o¤ in equilibrium with quantity-discounts and two-part
tari¤s relative to wholesale-price contracts.
Theorem 5 (ManufacturersPerspective) (i)The manufacturers prots are always higher un-
der two-part tari¤s than quantity-discount contracts. (ii) The manufacturers prots are higher un-
16
der quantity discounts than wholesale-price contracts if and only if  <
 
3 
p
7

  (0:354): (iii)
The manufacturers prots are higher under two-part tari¤s than wholesale-price contracts if and
only if  <
 
2 
p
2

  (0:586):
Manufacturer prots are always higher with two-part tari¤s than quantity discounts because
they both yield the same supply chain optimal price levels at equilibrium, but two-part tari¤s are
more e¤ective in rent extraction. This is di¤erent from the cases of a serial supply chain and
two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers, where the two contract forms are equiva-
lent. Comparing these contracts with the wholesale-price contracts is nontrivial. If the products
are highly substitutable, the manufacturersprots are lower under two-part tari¤s and quantity
discounts than wholesale-price contracts because they compete more aggressively with these con-
tracts.
Now, let us consider the problem from the retailers perspective. The next theorem compares
the retailers equilibrium prots under the three contract types.
Theorem 6 (Retailers Perspective) (i)The retailers prot is always higher under quantity-
discount contracts than two-part tari¤s. (ii)The retailers prot is higher under quantity discounts
than wholesale-price contracts if and only if  > 12
 
3 
p
7

  (0:177): (iii) The retailers prot
is higher under two-part tari¤s than wholesale-price contracts if and only if  > 12
 
3 
p
5

 
(0:382):
The retailer always prefers quantity-discount contracts to two-part tari¤s because they are
equally e¢ cient from a system perspective, but quantity discounts are less e¤ective in rent extraction
from the retailer. The second and third parts of the theorem state that the retailers prot is lower
under two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts only if the product substitutability is very
low. For a wide range of ; the retailer is better o¤ with quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s.
These results are di¤erent from the cases of a serial supply chain and two competing supply chains
with dedicated retailers, where the two-part tari¤ and quantity-discount contracts are equivalent
and the retailer always prefers the wholesale-price contracts to both of them. In the extreme
case of independent products, i.e.,  = 0, the retailers prot is zero with a quantity discount or
a two-part tari¤, because there is no competition and each manufacturer is able to extract all the
prot with sophisticated contracts.
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Figure 1: Contract preferences of the rms for di¤erent levels of substitutability.
These results demonstrate that the root cause of the retailers power is product substitutability.
We do not assign the retailer the power to dictate contract terms, yet with highly substitutable
products the retailer earns a larger share of the total prot due to quantity or pricing decision rights.
The retailer even prefers the more aggressive contract types when products are close substitutes,
because the benets of more intense competition dominates the disadvantage of the rent extraction
by the manufacturers.
Figure 1 illustrates the manufacturersand the retailers contract preferences for di¤erent levels
of substitutability. While the contract preference of the retailer is the reverse of the manufacturers
for low and high substitutability cases, for a range of medium substitutability, all players prefer
the more sophisticated contracts to wholesale-price contracts, as the increase in supply chain prot
dominates the e¤ects of the competition and rent extraction. These results have implications on
which contractual forms could be observed in practice, depending on who determines the contract
forms in a supply chain and the level of substitutability between products.
5.4 Complementary Products
Two products are complements if the demand rate of one increases with the consumption of the
other. Complementary products can be included in our model by allowing the cross-elasticity
parameter  to be negative. In this section, we briey describe what elements of the above
analysis and results apply in the case with complementary products. The analysis of the retailers
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problem remains the same, with the technical stipulation that the quadratic parameter of the
quantity discounts vi must be chosen from [0; 2 ( + )) for joint concavity of the retail prot
function. More importantly, the nature of the game between the manufacturers changes with
complementary products. The manufacturers are no longer in competition and would like the
other to sell as much as possible. This leads to the decreasing best response functions wi (wj) as
can be seen from the expression given in Theorem 3. The equilibrium solutions given in Table
2 no longer apply for the limiting quantity discount and two-part tari¤ cases. Evaluating the
prot functions as v goes to 2 ( + ) for the special case considered above, we nd that the
manufacturer prots are equal to the supply chain optimal, (   c)2 =2 ( + ) ; and the retailers
prot is zero. There are multiple equilibria in the two-part tari¤ game where the payo¤s are
(1;2; ) = (̂12   ̂2; ̂2; 0) or (̂1; ̂12   ̂1; 0) ; or a linear combination of these points. For the
special case, ̂12 = (   c)2 = ( + ) and ̂i = (   c)2 =2, and the quantity-discount equilibrium
is the midpoint of the continuum of the equilibria of the two-part tari¤ game. These results are
formally stated and proved in Theorem 7 in the Appendix. In summary, without substitutability,
the retailer has no power, because it can no longer play the two manufacturers o¤ of each other.
Both the most aggressive quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s achieve coordination as well as
full rent extraction.
6. Numerical Study
This section presents numerical examples comparing the equilibrium solution when the manufactur-
ers o¤er wholesale-price, quantity-discount and two-part tari¤ contracts. We start with exploring
the e¤ect of the quadratic parameter of the quantity-discount contracts on manufacturer prots.
Recall the example in Table 1, in which the manufacturers are worse o¤ under quantity discounts
with v = 1:6 than wholesale-price contracts. Figure 2(a) plots the change in the manufacturers
prot for that example as v varies from zero to 2 (   ). As v decreases from 1.6 to 0.4, then
the manufacturers are better o¤ o¤ering quantity discounts than wholesale-price contracts - in this
case the manufacturer competition has not been intensied substantially, allowing them to increase
their prot. However, if the products become more substitutable (lower  or higher ), then the
manufacturers are worse o¤with quantity-discounts no matter how weak the quantity discounts are
(i.e., no matter how low v is). On the other hand, with less substitutable products (lower ) the
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Figure 2: The e¤ect of the concavity of quantity-discount contracts on manufacturer prots: %
change in 1 at equilibrium as v increases. Base case:  = 20;  = 2;  = 1; c = 1;K = 0:
manufacturers benet from quantity discounts at equilibrium. Figure 2(b) shows that including
inventory costs can make the negative e¤ects of competition with quantity discounts on the manu-
facturersprots more pronounced. This is because a higher level of economies of scale makes the
retailer more sensitive to the manufacturer o¤ers in making the quantity decisions, and in e¤ect
increases the retailers power in the system.
We constructed a numerical study to better understand the extent of these observations. We
chose parameters from the following sets, leading to 144 scenarios:  = f20; 40g;  = f1; 2; 4g;
 = f0:25; 0:5; 0:75; 0:25g  ; c = f1; 3g; K = f0; 1; 3g : We evaluate each scenario under
wholesale-price, quantity-discount, and two-part tari¤ contracts. For quantity-discount contracts,
we set v = f0; 0:5; 0:95; 1:8g  (   jj) if K = 0 and v = f0; 0:5; 0:95g  (   jj) ; if K > 0:
This leads to a total of 672 instances. In eight of the 144 scenarios, we havent been able to
nd an equilibrium for at least one of the contracts (including the wholesale-price contracts in ve
scenarios). Investigating the best response functions in those cases reveals that the e¤ect of the
economies of scale is very strong at the retailer and the manufacturers cycle between undercutting
prices to get the retailer to exclude the other manufacturer and being undercut. In those cases,
there does not exist an asymmetric equilibrium either. We report the results for the remaining
136 scenarios. As a validity check, we compare the average cost per unit that the retailer pays to
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the manufacturers, T (d)=d; with the two types of contracts: the average cost is 5% lower in the
quantity discounts equilibrium than the wholesale prices when v = 0:5 (   jj) and 11% lower when
v = 0:95 (   jj) ; which indicates that the quantity discounts in equilibrium in these examples are
modest.
Table 3 provides a summary of the comparison of prots relative to the wholesale-price equi-
librium. From the supply chain perspective, the total prot increases in all cases when quantity
discounts or two-part tari¤s are o¤ered. This is of course expected for two-part tari¤s, because
they achieve system coordination. Quantity discounts on the other hand achieve coordination only
at the extreme case as v goes to the limit. The total prot under quantity-discount contracts get
closer to the supply chain optimal as v increases and is almost as good as two-part tari¤s when
v = 1:8. The percentage increase in total prot decreases as product substitutability increases,
because the ine¢ ciency of the system under wholesale-price contracts decreases with higher .
For the retailer and manufacturer prots, let us rst focus on substitutable products case
(i.e.,  > 0). The manufacturersprots increase under quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s
relative to wholesale-price contracts when substitution is low (i.e.,  = 0:25). Furthermore, the
manufacturersprot increase is greater than the supply chains prot increase, which means that
the manufacturers are able to extract a higher share of the supply chains prot. As product
substitutability increases, the manufacturersprots are lower when they o¤er quantity discounts
and two-part tari¤s and the magnitude of the loss can be as high as 44%. The prot loss for
the manufacturers increase is higher with a more aggressive quantity discount (i.e., higher v) or a
two-part tari¤. In those cases the e¤ect of more aggressive competition among the manufacturers
dominates the e¤ect of increased supply chain prots. As the level of economies of scale increases,
the retailer benets even more from the switch to sophisticated contracts and the manufacturers
benet less. With a higher level of economies of scale, because the retailer has more incentive to
consolidate its demand to one product, the competition becomes more intense and the retailer gains
more power. In other words, the positive e¤ect of quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s on the
manufacturersprots in the case of low substitutability diminishes with higher degree of economies
of scale and the negative e¤ect in the case of high substitutability becomes more pronounced. For
instance, with  = 0:5 and v = 0:95 (   ) or two-part tari¤s, both the percentage of cases in
which the manufacturers are worse o¤ and the average magnitude of the loss increase with K:
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Change in Profit v =0.5(β-γ) v =0.95(β-γ) v =1.8(β-γ) v =0.5(β-γ) v =0.95(β-γ) v =0.5(β-γ) v =0.95(β-γ)
Supply Chain 5.7% 11.2% 21.3% 22.5% 5.8% 11.3% 22.6% 6.0% 11.8% 22.9%
Retailer 3.3% 6.0% 14.7% -23.4% 3.2% 5.9% -20.1% 3.3% 6.1% -11.2%
Manufacturers 7.3% 14.6% 25.8% 53.1% 7.5% 14.8% 50.2% 7.7% 15.2% 43.6%
% Cases Manuf. Loss 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Supply Chain 3.5% 6.8% 12.0% 12.5% 3.6% 6.9% 12.4% 3.7% 7.1% 12.1%
Retailer 6.2% 13.8% 38.5% 12.5% 6.6% 14.7% 16.3% 7.1% 15.8% 25.6%
Manufacturers 0.8% -0.2% -14.5% 12.5% 0.7% -0.6% 8.6% 0.5% -1.2% -0.3%
% Cases Manuf. Loss 0% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 41.7%
Supply Chain 1.4% 2.6% 4.1% 4.2% 1.4% 2.6% 3.9% 1.4% 2.6% 3.4%
Retailer 5.9% 12.4% 28.1% 17.3% 6.1% 12.9% 19.5% 6.3% 13.1% 23.0%
Manufacturers -7.5% -16.9% -44.2% -21.9% -8.2% -18.6% -27.9% -8.6% -19.3% -39.8%
% Cases Manuf. Loss 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Supply Chain 9.2% 19.0% 40.9% 44.6% 9.3% 19.3% 45.1% 9.6% 20.0% 46.1%
Retailer -3.1% -10.9% -63.9% -100.0% -3.7% -12.3% -100.0% -5.1% -15.7% -100.0%
Manufacturers 14.1% 30.9% 82.9% 102.5% 14.3% 31.3% 100.6% 14.7% 32.2% 96.5%
% Cases Manuf. Loss 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 3. Average percentage change in the supply chain, retailer and manufacturer profits in equilibrium under quantity-discount and
two-part tariff contracts relative to the equilibrium under wholesale-price contracts.
γ = 0.25 × β
γ = 0.5 × β
γ = 0.75 × β
γ = −0.25 × β
Two-Part 
Tariff
Quantity Discount Quantity Discount Two-Part 
Tariff
K=0 K=1 K=3
Quantity Discount Two-Part 
Tariff
The retailers prot decreases relative to the wholesale-price contracts only with two-part tari¤s
and when substitutability is low. This is because manufacturers can extract rents well with two-part
tari¤ contracts. (We would expect similar results for the quantity-discount contracts for  lower
than 0.177 based on Theorem 6.) Even with two-part tari¤s, the average change decreases (from
-23.4% to -11.2%) as the level of economies of scale increases in the system. Higher substitutability
and higher economies of scale endow the retailer with more power in the system, and the switch
to more aggressive contracts is benecial for the retailer. As can be seen from low economies of
scale and low substitution cases, the retailer may prefer less aggressive quantity discounts to the
two-part tari¤s, because quantity discounts extract rents from the retailer less e¤ectively. For
medium substitutability and low economies of scale cases, both the retailer and the manufacturers
benet from the use of more sophisticated contracts relative to the wholesale-price contracts.
Our observations from the cases with complementary products is consistent with those with
substitutable products. Because the retailer power diminishes with complementary products,
the retailers prot always decreases and the manufacturer prots always increase with quantity
discounts. Two-part tari¤s achieve both system coordination and full rent extraction in all cases.
In summary, the decisions for the two products are more tightly linked if they are close substi-
tutes or the level of economies of scale is high. This increases the retailers endogenous reservation
prot and e¤ectively the retailers power in its relation with each manufacturer. Our results sug-
gest that the manufacturers are better o¤ employing the simple wholesale-price contracts when
dealing with a powerful retailer rather than the more sophisticated quantity discounts or two-part
tari¤s. When quantity discounts and two-part tari¤s are not very useful to the supply chain,
because products are highly substitutable, they are particularly destructive for the manufacturers.
If they benet the supply chain substantially, then they are good for the manufacturers too.
7. Discussion
This paper is a rst attempt to consider contracts other than wholesale-price contracts in systems
with multiple competing manufacturers and a single common retailer. We demonstrate that,
holding manufacturer Bs contract o¤er xed, manufacturer A can use a quantity discount or two-
part tari¤ to improve supply chain performance and extract rents, as is known with contracting
in supply chains with a monopolist manufacturer. However, when the manufacturers compete in
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the contract o¤ers, then we show that the manufacturers may be worse o¤ with quantity discounts
or two-part tari¤s relative to wholesale-price contracts even though the supply chain can be better
o¤. When downstream competition between the manufacturers is high, i.e., when the products are
close substitutes, the retailer benets considerably when the manufacturers compete with the more
aggressive contracts, and the manufacturers are worse o¤. If the products are not close substitutes,
then the retailer may be harmed by the more aggressive contracts and the manufacturers are better
o¤, because the manufacturers are able to extract rent more e¤ectively. We nd these e¤ects to be
more signicant when the level of economies of scale at the retailer is high. In summary, when the
products are close substitutes or the level of economies of scale at the retailer is high, the retailers
endogenous reservation prot (the value of the option to carry more of the competitors product)
increases and e¤ectively the retailers power in its relation with each manufacturer. Our results
suggest that the manufacturers are better o¤ employing the simple wholesale-price contracts in
such cases rather than the more sophisticated quantity discounts or two-part tari¤s. While the
retailers preference is the reverse of the manufacturersfor low and high substitutability cases, all
rms prefer the more sophisticated contracts for a range of medium substitutability. Finally, unlike
in serial supply chains and two competing supply chains with dedicated retailers, two-part tari¤s
and quantity discounts are not equivalent from the manufacturersand the retailers perspectives
because two-part tari¤s allow more rent extraction by the manufacturers at equilibrium. We
conclude that it is important to study the properties of a contractual form in the presence of
competition between manufacturers.
The prominence of wholesale-price contracts in practice and their widespread use in many
industries, despite the fact that the manufacturersoptimal contract is usually a more sophisticated
one, has been an open empirical question for researchers. One possible explanation has to do with
the simplicity and lower implementation costs associated with wholesale-price contracts. Our
results may provide another hypothesis to include in this discussion. The manufacturers in our
model essentially face a prisonersdilemma game - their best myopic action is always to o¤er the
most aggressive contract, but this then leads to an equilibrium in which they are both worse o¤.
In a repeated game setting, it is well known that the players may be able to coordinate on the good
outcome (o¤ering wholesale-price contracts when the products are close substitutes) by utilizing
trigger strategies (defections are penalized by the other rm for a limited number of periods)
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even though the bad outcome, o¤ering quantity-discount or two-part tari¤ contracts, is the Nash
equilibrium in a single-shot game. It may be argued that the manufacturers have learned not to
engage in actions that will trigger punishment, and hence choose wholesale-price contracts over
more sophisticated contracts that are myopically optimal, but harmful at equilibrium. It will be
interesting to test this hypothesis empirically by investigating which contract types are commonly
used for various product groups with di¤erent levels of substitutability.
A quantity discount essentially reduces a retailers marginal cost. Other contracts, such as
buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts, have a similar e¤ect on the retailer. Thus, we suspect
that similar results can be found for manufacturers competing with these contracts. That may
require, however, retailer models that are di¤erent from ours, such as a model with inventory
competition (i.e., substitution between products based on availability). While the particular
retailer model we have worked with presents many technical di¢ culties in the presence of economies
of scale, alternative models may not be less challenging. For the inventory competition model, the
characterization of the best response of a manufacturer even in the simpler wholesale-price case
can be achieved only under restrictive assumptions (see Kök 2003). The derivation of the optimal
wholesale-price contract with the method in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is not possible because
the retailer changes the quantities of both products in response to a change in the wholesale-price of
one manufacturer. Finally, extension of this discussion to a setting with multiple common retailers
or considering other forms of competition between manufacturers, such as based on product quality
or assortment depth, may lead to richer and more complicated dynamics.
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Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1
Proof. The proof holds for general quantity discount contracts that satisfy
Ti(0) = 0; T
0
i (d)  ci;  vi  T 00i (d)  0; T 000(d)  0; T 0000(d)  0: (15)
The quantity discount contract given by (2) satises these conditions. The proof consists of two
steps. The rst step proves that the retailers problem would not admit more than one local
maximum in f(di; dj) : di > 0 for i = 1; 2g. The second step characterizes each of the solutions
( ~d1; ~d2); ( ~d1 (0) ; 0); (0; ~d2 (0)). The proof of the rst step is by contradiction. Suppose that there
are two interior local maxima: (x0; y0) and (x00; y00) : The line that connects (x0; y0) and (x00; y00) can
be characterized by (x0 + t; y0 + t) ; where  = x00   x0,  = y00   y0; ;  2 <, t 2 [0; 1] represents
the line segment between the two points, and t 2 < represents the whole line. Dene (t) as the
value of  on that line,
(t) = 
 
x0 + t; y0 + t

We have,
0(t) =
@
@di
@di
@t
+
@
@dj
@dj
@t
= 
@
@di
+ 
@
@dj
:
Because (t) achieves local maxima at the points (x0; y0) and (y0; x0) ; we have 0(t) = 0 and
00 (t) < 0 at these points. We now derive higher order derivatives:
000 (t) =  3G000i
 
x0 + t

  3G000j
 
y0 + t

  3T 000i
 
x0 + t

  3T 000j
 
y0 + t

0000 (t) =  4G0000i
 
x0 + t

  4G0000j
 
y0 + t

  4T 0000i
 
x0 + t

  4T 0000j
 
y0 + t

It follows that 0000 (t) > 0 because G0000i (di) =   (1  ) (2  ) (3  )Kid 3i < 0 and T 0000i  0
by equation (2). Therefore, 000 (t) is increasing.
Recall that 0(t) = 0 and 00(t) < 0 at t 2 f0; 1g: Given that (t) is continuous in t; this can
only occur if there is at least one segment in t 2 [0; 1] such that 0(t) is convex-concave, which
requires that 000(t) is decreasing along some segment. However, we have established that 000 (t)
is increasing. Hence, a contradiction.
For the second step, it su¢ ces to say that the interior optimal solution ( ~d1; ~d2) satises the rst
order conditions fHi = 0, i = 1; 2g : The solution on the boundary ( ~d1 (0) ; 0) satises the rst
order condition fH1 = 0; s.t. d2 = 0g. Similarly for (0; ~d2 (0)):
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It is easy to see that the prot function is convex-concave along the di = 0 lines.
@ (di; 0) =@di = i   2idi  G0i (di)  T 0i (di) ;
@2 (di; 0) =@d
2
i =  2i  G00i (di)  T 00i (di) :
The second derivative is (i) decreasing in di, (ii) positive at di = 0 (becauseG00i (di) =   (1  )Kid 2i !
 1 as di ! 0+); and (iii) negative for su¢ ciently large di: Thus, there can be at most one local
maximum for each problem.
For a symmetric problem, it follows from the above argument that the unique interior optimal
solution is on the di = dj line. (If (di; dj) with di 6= dj is an interior optimal solution, then there
are at least two local maxima, because (dj ; di) is also an optimal solution by the symmetry of the
prot function. This contradicts with the result above.) Similar to the boundary lines, the prot
function is convex-concave on the di = dj line and the solution is characterized by the rst order
condition
@ (d; d) =@d =    2 ( + ) d G0 (d)  T 0 (d) = 0:
Lemma 1 The the retailer function  (d1; d2) is jointly concave in the region where (d1; d2) satises
(12) and Ti(di) satises (11).
Proof. First consider the retailers problem under wholesale-price contracts from both manufactur-
ers. We show that the Hessian is a negative semi-denite matrix, which guarantees joint concavity
of the prot function. Note that (12) implies that 2Ri=Gi = 2pidi=Gi > (=
 
2   2

)(pi=di):
First,
@2=@d2i =  2 +  (1  )Gid 2i  0
if and only if (1=i)pi=di  2 1 (1  ) 1 pidi=Gi; which is implied by (12), =
 
2   2

> (1=);
and  1 (1  ) 1  4. Second, we show that the Hessian is a diagonally dominant matrix.
@2=@d2i  = 2    (1  )Gid 2i  @2=@dj@di = 2
if and only if pi=di  2 (   ) 1 (1  ) 1 pidi=Gi; which holds under (12) if =
 
2   2

>
1= (2   2), equivalently 2 >  + :
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The proof of the case with quantity discount contracts is similar. To show diagonal dominance,
we split the right-hand-side of the second derivatives to show (   ) >  G00i and (   ) >  T 00i :
The former inequality holds by the condition (12) and the latter by (11).
Remark 1
Proof. Suppose manufacturer 1 o¤ers T1 (d1) and there exists a demand pair (d01; d
0
2) such that
1 = 0: By denition, 2(d01; d
0
2) = R2(d
0
1; d
0
2) T2(d02) G2(d02): We have 2(d01; d02) < 2(0; d02) 
2(0; d2(0)): The rst inequality is due to @R02(d1; d2)=@d1 < 0 for all d1; d2 and T1 (d1) is non-
decreasing: the retailer can always increase her revenue from product 2 by dropping product 1, and
her payment to manufacturer 1 cannot increase. The second inequality follows by optimality of
d2(0): Therefore (0; ~d2(0)) > (d01; d
0
2):
Proposition 1
The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Among all quantity discounts that satisfy T 00i (di)   vi; the dominant strategy for
manufacturer i has the following functional form.
Ti(di; wi; vi) =

wid  vid2i =2; if di  (wi   ci) =vi
Ti((wi   ci) =vi) + ci (di   (wi   ci) =vi) ; otherwise.
(16)
Thus, for given Tj(dj ; wj ; vj) and xed vi; the best response of manufacturer i is given by Ti(di; wi ; vi)
for some wi  [ci; i (vi=i + 1)]:
Proof. Without loss of generality, let j = 2; and i = 1: Take any T1(d1) and T2(d2): Suppose
that the retailers optimal solution is an internal point ~d = ( ~d1; ~d2). (The proof is simpler if one
of ~di is zero.) At the optimal solution the rst order conditions are satised: fH1 = 0;H2 = 0g :
Dene  such that
 = H1( ~d) + T
0
1(
~d1) =
@

R1( ~d) +R2( ~d) G1( ~d1)

@d1
We have T 01( ~d1) =  : The optimal discount scheme for M1 among those that generate ~d is the
solution to
max T1( ~d1)
subject to Hi( ~d) = 0; for i = 1; 2:
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The constraints guarantee that both rst order conditions are satised at ( ~d1; ~d2). The retailer
function is jointly concave everywhere in the absence of economies of scale at the retailer as long
as Ti satises T 00i (di)   vi. Thus ( ~d1; ~d2) remains the optimal solution (and the unique local
maximum) for the retailer. In the presence of economies of scale, ( ~d1; ~d2) remains the unique interior
optimal solution for the retailer by Theorem 1 as long as Ti satises (11). Because, the retailer
prot is jointly concave when (10)-(12) are satised, ( ~d1; ~d2) remains the optimal solution in the
region dened by (12).
The manufacturers problem can be written as fmax T1( ~d1) : T 01( ~d1) = g because the condition
implies H1( ~d) = 0 and we already have H2( ~d) = 0: Therefore, the objective is to increase T1( ~d1)
while keeping the marginal cost at ~d1 the same. This can be achieved by reducing T 01(d1) as little as
possible for all d1 < ~d1; which can be achieved by setting T 001 (d1) = v1: Together with T
0
1(
~d1) =  ;
this implies that
T 01(d1) =  v1

d1   ~d1

+  ; for all d1 2
h
0; ~d1
i
That is, the marginal cost to the retailer is decreasing as slowly as possible and equals  at ~d: We
have T 001 ( ~d1) =  v1. T 01 (d1) can be specied in any way for d1 > ~d1 as long as it satises (15). We
use the same functional form to specify T 01(d1) (which implies that T
00
1 (d1) =  v) for all d1 > ~d1
to make sure that the argument applies to all ~d1. Another condition in (15) requires T 01(d1)  c1.
T 01 is decreasing linearly in d1 and it will reach c1 at some nite value. Rewriting T
0
1, we replace
v1 ~d1 +  with w1 to obtain,
T 01(d1) =

w1   v1d1; for d1  (w1   c1) =v1
c1; for d1 > (w1   c1) =v1
Integrating T 0 and recalling the boundary value T (0) = 0 by (15), we obtain the quantity discount
schedule
T1(d1) =

w1d1   v1d21=2; if d1  (w1   c1) =v1
T1((w1   c1) =v1) + c1 (d1   (w1   c1) =v1) ; otherwise:
Note that this is not the optimal discount scheme over all possible discount schemes. It is the
best scheme among the ones that produce ~d: In other words, the functional form dominates other
functional forms of T1(d1): Thus, the optimal quantity discount scheme can be found by considering
the functions of this type only. We will see in Theorem 2 that the constant part of T 01(d1) is not
relevant. A technical note is needed here that (15) requires continuous and di¤erentiable payment
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functions, but the suggested solution has a non-di¤erentiable point. This can be circumvented by
replacing the two-piece marginal cost function with a di¤erentiable convex decreasing function that
approximates it very closely.
The manufacturer prot is zero if w1  c1: It is also zero, if w1  1 (v1=1 + 1) ; because the
marginal cost to the retailer w1   v1d1 > w1   v11=1 > 1 (v1=1 + 1)   v11=1 = 1; which
implies zero demand. The rst inequality is due to d1  1=1 to keep p1 nonnegative. If the
retailer charges 1 for product 1; the demand cannot be positive, which implies that i = 0.
Theorem 2
Proof. Recall that vi = 0 when the manufacturers employ wholesale-price contracts. Furthermore,
while evaluating the equilibrium, we need to only consider the quadratic part of the payment
functions. Suppose by contradiction, that the retailer chose di such that di > (wi   ci) =vi: The
manufacturer can increase wi such that di = (wi   ci) =vi and increase its prot without a¤ecting
the retailers or the other manufacturers decisions.
We show in the proof that i is concave in wi at the symmetric solution to the rst order condition
stated in the theorem. Hence, the solution is (at least) a local maximum.
Using the quadratic part of Ti; we obtain the rst order condition for a manufacturer as follows.
@i
@wi
at wi = d

i + (wi   ci   vidi )
@di
@wi
= 0
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem on the retailers rst order conditions fHi = 0; for
all ig, we can derive the impact of the wholesale prices on the optimal demand rates. Dene
Ai = (2i +G
00
i + T
00
i ) ; A
0
i = @Ai=@di = G
000
i =  (1  ) (2  ) d 3i =   (2  ) d
 1
i G
00
i > 0;
B =
 
i + j

; and  = AiAj   B2: Note that  > 0 because of the diagonal dominance of the
Hessian as show in Lemma 1. 
@di =@wi
@dj=@wi

=
1
AiAj  B2

 Aj 
i + j

As expected, di decreases with wi and increases with wj : The second derivative of i yields
2
@di
@wi
  v

@di
@wi
2
+ (wi   ci   vidi )
@2di
@w2i
;
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which is negative when d1 = d

2; because we have A
0
1 = A
0
2 and
@2di
@w2i
=  2

 A0jB 1+Aj
 
AiA
0
jB
 1 +A0iAj ( Aj) 1

=  3

 A0jB+
 
AiAjA
0
jB  A0iA3j

=  3

 A0jBAiAj +A0jB3 +
 
AiAjA
0
jB  A0iA3j

=  3

 A0iA3j +A0jB3

< 0
Hence, the rst order condition above has a unique solution when d1 = d

2: The solution (w

1; w

2)
satises the rst and second order conditions for both manufacturers. That is, wi is a local
maximum of i for xed wj , and vice versa. If wi > wi ; then d

1 decreases and d

2 increases, A
0
i
increases, Aj increases, and A0j decreases, implying that @
2di =@w
2
i remains negative. Hence, i is
concave in wi for wi > wi for xed w

j . Thus, there can be no other local maximum greater than
wi ; but a linear search in [wi; w

i ] is necessary to nd the optimal wholesale price.
Theorem 1
Proof. The optimal demand rates can be solved as the unique solution to rst order conditions
fHi = 0; i = 1; 2g for given (w1; w2) : We have   @di=@wi =  
 
2j   vj

=, @2di=@w2i = 0,
and @2di=@wi@wj = 0; @di=@wj =
 
i + j

=: Substituting these in the rst order conditions in
Theorem 2, we verify that the prot function of manufacturer i is concave in wi. This guarantees
the existence of equilibria in the quantity discount game between the manufacturers. The best
response wi (wj) is the explicit solution to each rst order condition. Di¤erentiating, we obtain
@wi
@wj
=
(1  vi)
 
i + j

=
 2+ vi2
=
(1  vi)
 
i + j
 
2j   vj

(2  v)
> 0 and < 1:
The second inequality is due to vi < 2i 
 
i + j

. Hence, we have increasing reaction functions
with a slope less than 1. This implies that there is a unique equilibrium of the game between the
manufacturers.
Theorem 4
Proof. The rst part of the proof shows that for any set of contracts by the manufacturers,
manufacturer i can do better by switching to a two-part tari¤ (Fi; ci) : Let us focus without loss
of generality on manufacturer 1. Let superscripts b and a denote the solutions before and after
the contract change. Take any potential manufacturer equilibrium (T1(d1); T2 (d2)), where the
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retailer chooses
 
db1; d
b
2

with db1 > 0: Suppose that manufacturer 1 (M1) switches to two-part
tari¤
 
T1
 
db1

  c1db1; c1

: If the retailer optimal solution (da1; d
a
2) is interior or d
a
2 = 0, M1s
prot remains the same, i.e., equal to T1
 
db1

  c1db1. It is not possible that da1 = 0; because
r;a (da1; d
a
2)  r;a
 
db1; d
b
2

= r;b
 
db1; d
b
2

> r;b(0; db2(0)) = 
r;a(0; da2(0)): The rst inequality is
due to optimization, the equality because the payment to M1 has not changed, the second inequality
from the optimality of
 
db1; d
b
2

before the contract change, and the last equality holds because the
contract for product 2 has not been changed. If db1 = 0; then M1 prot was zero, switching the
contract to two-part tari¤ (0; c1) yields zero prot for any (da1; d
a
2) :
The second part characterizes the equilibrium fees (F 1 ; F

2 ) : For any (F1; c1) ; (F2; c2); we have i =
Fi1fdi>0g; and  = max f̂1   F1; ̂2   F2; ̂12   F1   F2; 0g : Let us focus on M1. If F2  ̂12 ̂1;
then ̂1  F1  ̂12  F1  F2 and  = max f̂2   F2; ̂12   F1   F2g and M1s best response to F2
is to set F1 as high as possible while ensuring that ̂12 F1 F2  ̂2 F2 hence F 1 (F2) = ̂12  ̂2:
If ̂2  F2 > ̂12   ̂1; then ̂1   F1 > ̂12   F1   F2 and  = max f̂1   F1; ̂2   F2g and M1s
best response to F2 is to set F1 as high as possible while ensuring that ̂1   F1  ̂2   F2: Hence
F 1 (F2) = ̂1   ̂2 + F2   " for arbitrarily small ": If F2 > ̂2; then ̂1   F1 > ̂12   F1   F2
and  = max f̂1   F1; 0g and M1s best response is to set F1 = ̂1: The best response function
of manufacturer 2 is similarly obtained: F 2 (F1) = f̂12   ̂1; if F1  ̂12   ̂2; ̂2   ̂1 + F1   ",
otherwise}. The unique equilibrium point is (F 1 ; F

2 ) = (̂12   ̂1; ̂12   ̂1): At equilibrium,
the retailers prot is  = ̂12   (̂12   ̂1)   (̂12   ̂2) = ̂1 + ̂2   ̂12: The retailers prot is
nonnegative, because ̂12  ̂1 + ̂2 follows from the substitutability of the products.
Derivation of the prot expressions in Table 2
Total prot in the centralized system:
The optimal demand rates and the prot are as follows.
di
dj

=
1
4
 
2   2
  2  2 2 2
 
i + ci
j + cj

;
di =
 (i   ci)   (j   cj)
2
 
2   2
 ; pi   ci = i   ci2 ;
̂ij =
 (i   ci)2 +  (j   cj)2   2 (j   cj) (i   ci)
4
 
2   2
 ;
if symmetric: ̂ij = 2
(   c)2
4 ( + )
:
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If only product i were carried, then
pi   ci = (i   ci) =2; di =
(i   ci)
2
; and ̂i =
(i   ci)2
4
:
Equilibrium under two-part tari¤s:
By Theorem 4, manufacturer i s optimal strategy is of a (Fi; ci) type two-part tari¤.
i = F

i = ̂ij   ̂j =
 (i   ci)2 +  (j   cj)2   2 (j   cj) (i   ci)
4
 
2   2
   (j   cj)2
4
=
2 (i   ci)2 + 2 (j   cj)2   2 (j   cj) (i   ci)
4
 
2   2
 ;
if symmetric : i =
(   c)2 (   )
4 ( + )
:
The retailers prot in the symmetric case is
 = ̂i + ̂j   ̂ij
=
2 (   c)2
4
  2 (   c)
2
4 ( + )
=
(   c)2 
2 ( + )
:
Equilibrium under quantity discount and wholesale-price contracts:
Based on the demand rates and reaction functions derived in Theorem 1, we can solve the
equilibrium for the symmetric problem. Recall that   (2   v)2  (2)2 : The unique symmetric
equilibrium given vi = vj = v is characterized by
w =
 (2   v   2) ( + v (2   v)) + c (2   v) 
 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
=
 ( + v (2   v)) + c (2   v) (2   v + 2)
(2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) :
w   c = (   c) (2   v   2) ( + v (2   v))
 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
=
(   c) ( + v (2   v))
(2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) :
Substituting v = 0 yields the equilibrium wholesale prices, and taking the limit as v ! 2 (   )
yields the equilibrium under the most aggressive quantity discounts.
At v = 0 :
w =
 (   ) + c ()
(2   ) , w   c =
(   c) (   )
(2   ) ,    w =
(   c)
(2   ) :
As v ! 2 (   ) :
w =
 (   ) + c (2)
( + )
, w   c = (   c) (   )
( + )
,    w = (   c) (2)
( + )
:
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Similarly, the demand rates at the wholesale and the quantity discount rates are given by
d =
(2   v   2) (   w)
(2   v)2   (2)2
=
   w
2   v + 2
=



 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
  (2   v   2) ( + v (2   v))

  c (2   v) 

 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
1
2   v + 2
=
(   c)  (2   v)
 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
1
2   v + 2
=
(   c) (2   v   2) (2   v)
 (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2)
=
(   c) (2   v)
(2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) :
At v = 0 : d =
(   c)
(2 + 2) (2   ) ;
As v ! 2 (   ) : d = (   c)
2 ( + )
:
p   w =    ( + )    w
2   v + 2   w =
(   w) (   v + )
2   v + 2 :
The retailers prot at equilibrium is
 = 2
 
pd  wd+ vd2=2

=
2 (   w) (   v + )
2   v + 2 d+ vd
2
= 2
(   c)2 (2   v + 2) (2   v)2
((2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v))2
(   v + )
2   v + 2
+v
(   c)2 (2   v)2
((2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v))2
 =
(   c)2 (2   v)2 (2   v + 2)
((2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v))2
(17)
At v = 0 :  =
(   c)2 2
(2 + 2) (2   )2
:
As v ! 2 (   ) :
 =
2 (   w) (   v + )
2   v + 2 + vd
2
=
2 ( c)(2)(+) (   v + )
2   v + 2
(   c)
2 ( + )
+ v
(   c)2
4 ( + )2
=
2 (2) (   v + )
2   v + 2
(   c)2
2 ( + )2
+ v
(   c)2
4 ( + )2
 =
(   c)2 
( + )2
:
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Manufacturers prot at equilibrium is
 = (w   c) d  vd2=2 = ((w   c)  vd=2) d =
=

(   c) (2   v   2) ( + v (2   v))
  (v=2) (   c) (2   v   2) (2   v)

(   c) (2   v   2) (2   v)
( (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2))2
=
(   c)2 (2   v   2)2 (2   v) ( + (v=2) (2   v))
( (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v) (2   v   2))2
=
(   c)2 (2   v) ( + (v=2) (2   v))
((2   v + 2) (2 (2   v)  2) + v (2   v))2
: (18)
At v = 0 :  =
(   c)2 (2) ()
((2 + 2) (2 (2)  2))2
=
(   c)2 () (   )
2 ( + ) (2   )2
:
As v ! 2 (   ) :  = (   c)
2 (2) ((   ) (2))
((4) (2) + 2 (   ) (2))2
=
(   c)2 (   )
4 ( + )2
:
Theorem 5
Proof. Comparing the manufacturers prot expressions given in Table 2, we see that prots
under quantity discounts are always lower than those under two-part tari¤s because  < ( + ) :
Prot under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under quantity discounts if and only if
2 ( + ) < (2   )2 ; which is equivalent to 0 < 22   6 + 2: The right-hand-side is equal
to 22 at  = 0 and  32 at  = ; and it is decreasing in between, crossing zero only once at

 
3 
p
7

: Similarly, prot under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under two-part tari¤s
if and only if
 
22

< (2   )2 ; which is equivalent to 0 < 22   4 + 2: The right-hand-side
is equal to 22 at  = 0 and  2 at  = ; and it is decreasing in between, crossing zero only once
at 
 
2 
p
2

:
Theorem 6
Proof. Comparing the retailers prot expressions given in Table 2, we see that prots under
quantity discounts are always higher than those under two-part tari¤s because 2 > ( + ) :
Prot under wholesale-price contracts is less than that under quantity discounts if and only if
2 ( + )  2 (2   )2 < 0: The left-hand-side is positive for all   0; it is equal to 0 at  = ;
and it is convex in between, implying at most a single crossing point in (0; ) ; which would be
the smallest root of this third-degree polynomial, i.e., 12
 
3 
p
7

. Prot under wholesale-price
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contracts is less than that under two-part tari¤s if and only if 3  (2   )2 < 0: The left-hand-
side is positive for all   0; is equal to 0 at  = ; and it is convex in between, implying at most
a single crossing point in (0; ) ; which would be the smallest root, i.e., 12
 
3 
p
5

.
Theorem 7 Consider the case of symmetric complementary products and no economies of scale.
Under quantity discounts as v goes to 2 ( + ), the equilibrium prot of a manufacturer is (   c)2 =2 ( + ).
Under two-part tari¤s, there are multiple equilibria where the manufacturer prots are given by
(̂12   ̂2; ̂2) or (̂1; ̂12   ̂1) ; or a linear combination of these points. The retailer prot is zero
under both contracts.
Proof. For the quantity discount contract, substituting v = 2 ( + ) in equations (18) and (17)
gives the prots as stated. For the two-part tari¤ equilibrium, the equilibrium analysis of Theorem
4 needs to be revisited because with complementary products we have ̂12 > ̂1 + ̂2. For any
(F1; c1) ; (F2; c2); we have i = Fi1fdi>0g; and  = max f̂1   F1; ̂2   F2; ̂12   F1   F2; 0g : Let
us focus on the response of manufacturer 1 (M1). If F2  ̂2; then ̂1   F1  ̂12   F1   F2 and
 = max f̂2   F2; ̂12   F1   F2g and M1s best response to F2 is to set F1 as high as possible
while ensuring that ̂12   F1   F2  ̂2   F2 hence F 1 (F2) = ̂12   ̂2: If ̂12   ̂1  F2 = ̂2 + 
for  2 [0; ̂12   ̂1   ̂2] ; then  = max f̂12   F1   ̂2   ; 0g and M1s best response is F 1 =
̂12   F2: If F2 > ̂12   ̂1 then  = max f̂1   F1; 0g and M1s best response is F 1 = ̂1: The
best response function of manufacturer 2 is similar: F 2 (F1) = f̂12   ̂1; if F1  ̂1; ̂12   F1;
if ̂12   ̂2  F2 > ̂1; ̂2, otherwise}. The equilibrium points are (F 1 ; F 2 ) = (̂12   ̂2; ̂2),
(̂1; ̂12  ̂1); or any linear combination of these two points. The retailers prot is zero at all
equilibria. In the symmetric products case, ̂i = (   c)2 =4 and ̂12 = (   c)2 =2 ( + ) ; leading
to (F 1 ; F

2 ) = ((   c)
2 =4; (   c)2 (   ) =4 ( + )) or the reverse.
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